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THE PARLIAMENT OF THE EXPERTS 
ADRIAN VERMEULE† 
ABSTRACT 
   In the administrative state, how should expert opinions be 
aggregated and used? If a panel of experts is unanimous on a question 
of fact, causation, or prediction, can an administrative agency 
rationally disagree, and on what grounds? If experts are split into a 
majority view and a minority view, must the agency follow the 
majority? Should reviewing courts limit agency discretion to select 
among the conflicting views of experts, or to depart from expert 
consensus? I argue that voting by expert panels is likely, on average, 
to be epistemically superior to the substantive judgment of agency 
heads, in determining questions of fact, causation, or prediction. Nose 
counting of expert panels should generally be an acceptable basis for 
decision under the arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence 
tests. Moreover, agencies should be obliged to follow the 
(super)majority view of an expert panel, even if the agency’s own 
judgment is to the contrary, unless the agency can give an 
epistemically valid second-order reason for rejecting the panel 
majority’s view. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the administrative state, a great deal of agency 
decisionmaking draws upon the aggregate view of a group of experts, 
especially when there is an expert “consensus.” Under what 
conditions is this practice sensible, or not? If experts are unanimous 
on a complex question of fact, causation, or prediction, can an agency 
rationally disagree, and on what grounds? If experts are split into a 
majority view and a minority view, must the agency follow the 
majority? Should reviewing courts limit agency discretion to select 
among the conflicting views of experts, or to depart from expert 
consensus? 
To come to grips with these problems, I will focus on advisory 
panels of scientific and technical experts and their role in 
administrative law. How should the views and votes of the members 
of these expert panels, whether unanimous or conflicting, be 
aggregated and incorporated into agency decisionmaking and judicial VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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review of agency action? The problem is ubiquitous in administrative 
law; it also underlies several major episodes that, observers suggest, 
illustrate the politicization of science under the Bush administration. 
To structure the discussion, I will examine problems like the 
following: 
￿  In 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
promulgated ozone standards that had been approved by a bare 
majority, six of eleven members, of a scientific advisory panel;
1 
similarly, in 1997, EPA revised its standards for ozone and particulate 
matter and justified the revisions in part by reference to the 
consensus or majority views of the panel.
2 In 2006, however, in issuing 
a final rule on particulate matter, the Administrator declined to 
follow the recommendations of the same panel, in part because the 
panel was not unanimous; two out of the twenty-two members had 
dissented.
3 Are these positions consistent? If they are not, which was 
correct? 
￿ In the second case, when twenty of twenty-two scientists on the 
advisory panel recommended action that EPA declined to take, 
would EPA’s decision look better or worse if the panel had been 
unanimous? 
￿  A statute gives benefits to miners who suffer from 
pneumoconiosis, or black lung disease. In a black lung case, three 
experts give a diagnosis that there is no pneumoconiosis, whereas two 
experts disagree.
4 May the administrative law judge say that the three 
diagnoses outweigh the two, and award benefits on that basis? May 
the judge say that the two diagnoses outweigh the three? 
￿ The National Marine Fisheries service must decide whether to 
list a genetically significant subpopulation of salmon as threatened. It 
convenes a panel of sixteen scientists to decide, among other things, 
whether certain technical measures will avert the danger. The panel 
splits about evenly.
5 Can the agency adopt either view? 
Administrative law has no consistent view about how expertise 
should be aggregated in cases like these. In particular, judicial 
decisions are inconsistent about whether agencies may or must count 
 
  1.  Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
  2.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 367, 376–79 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
  3.  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144, 
61,174 n.44 (Oct. 17, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2008)). 
  4.  Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007). 
  5.  Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1148 (D. Or. 1998). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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noses—whether agencies may or must aggregate expertise by treating 
expert views as votes, and adopting the view for which a majority or 
supermajority of experts casts their votes. My major normative claim 
is that nose counting by agencies is usually permissible and should 
sometimes be mandatory; I mean to praise the parliament of the 
experts. In some cases judges say that agencies may not count noses, 
but I will say that agencies should be allowed to do so. In other cases, 
I will even claim that agencies should be presumptively obligated to 
adopt the views of a majority or supermajority of the experts on the 
agency’s advisory panels, absent the right kind of epistemic reason for 
departing from those views. 
In short, administrative law sometimes, although inconsistently, 
has a horror of a quantitative approach to the incorporation of 
expertise, and a strong preference for a qualitative, reason-based 
approach. But I will claim that when agencies are uncertain of facts, 
causation, or future consequences of alternative policies, following 
the consensus or majority view of experts is a perfectly rational 
decisionmaking strategy. Indeed, nose counting of experts is 
presumptively superior to fact-finding based on the agency’s own 
substantive reasons or views, and it should prevail unless there is a 
sound epistemic reason to believe that the agency is better positioned 
than the expert panel to determine the relevant facts. 
Much of the confusion and inconsistency surrounding these 
issues is dispelled by a simple distinction between first-order reasons 
and second-order reasons. First-order reasons are reasons for 
thinking that a particular claim of fact, causation, or prediction is 
correct. Second-order reasons are reasons for thinking that the 
epistemic capacities of (a group of) experts are such that their first-
order views are more or less likely to be correct, compared to the 
agency’s first-order views. When courts say that agencies who have 
counted expert noses have given no valid reason for the decision, the 
courts overlook that nose counting, although it offers no first-order 
reason, is a perfectly rational second-order decisionmaking strategy 
for agencies that lack first-order competence. Furthermore, when the 
weight of expert opinion on matters of fact, causation, or prediction 
tilts in one direction, agencies should be required either to follow the 
expert opinion or else give a valid second-order reason to think that 
expert opinion is epistemically suspect. Contrary to much of the VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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current law, I suggest that the agency’s own first-order reasons are 
not an adequate basis for departing from the expert consensus.
6 
Part I lays out some preliminary assumptions and offers a 
synopsis of relevant administrative law doctrine. Part II asks when 
agencies  may count noses, focusing on cases in which laws bar 
agencies from counting expert noses. I suggest that nose counting, 
under identifiable conditions, is a perfectly sound second-order 
epistemic strategy; when those conditions are met, courts should hold 
that nose counting is a rational basis for agency decisionmaking. Part 
III describes the conditions under which agency nose counting is 
inadequate. Part IV asks when agencies must count noses, focusing on 
cases in which agencies attempt to depart from the findings reached 
by a consensus or a majority of experts. I suggest an easily 
implemented presumption: agencies should not be permitted to 
depart from the findings of expert panels unless they can give a valid 
second-order reason to think that the consensus or majority view of 
experts as to matters of fact is not epistemically reliable. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
I.  ASSUMPTIONS AND THE LAW 
A. Preliminaries 
Critics of the Bush administration’s decisionmaking decry the 
“politicization” of science.
7 The anecdotes are many, and unsettling, 
but the critics are rarely clear or explicit about the theory that 
underlies the critique, and the very variety of the anecdotes 
underscores that the problems are highly heterogeneous. In many 
cases,
8 expert consensus is used as an implicit benchmark for 
 
  6. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at EPA, 66 LAW  &  CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 45, 51 (Autumn 2003) (“When the scientists at EPA, such as the Science Advisory 
Board, have refused to approve the Agency’s scientific rationale, a court should consider that 
refusal in giving lesser deference to the agency’s decision.”). Although I agree with the broad 
thrust of Elliott’s suggestion, I hope to make the idea of “lesser deference” more precise, in part 
by distinguishing between the agency’s first-order reasons (which will not be a valid basis for 
departing from the expert panel’s recommendations) and the agency’s second-order reasons 
(which may be a valid basis for doing so, under some identifiable conditions). 
  7. See,  e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. 
L. 1083, 1084 (2007) (discussing “[t]he [Bush] administration’s efforts to politicize science”). 
  8.  Shapiro offers two examples of “science denial” and “politicization” by the Bush 
administration. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1086–87. The first is that the administration “refus[ed] 
to acknowledge or act on the overwhelming scientific evidence of global climate change . . . .” 
Id. at 1086. In the second, “[t]he Food and Drug Administration . . . refused to approve the VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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determining that science has been politicized, yet that benchmark is 
undertheorized. 
Somewhat paradoxically, I believe that the best response to this 
heterogeneity is to focus on a crucial subset of the relevant issues. If 
the subset is well chosen, it will illuminate the structure of the 
broader problem while avoiding the morass of detail in which these 
critiques sometimes sink. Accordingly, I focus on the relationship 
between agencies and the scientific and technical panels that advise 
them, and on judicial review of agency action involving decisions that 
follow or reject the recommendation of an expert panel.
9 
Some preliminary assumptions are necessary to clarify the 
questions. I will assume that agency policymaking is a two-stage 
process, encompassing both fact-finding and evaluation. At the first 
stage the agency finds “facts”—namely, discrete adjudicative facts, 
background conditions or legislative facts, causal theories, and 
predictions about the consequences of alternative policies. Expertise, 
in this framework, just means a higher probability of getting the facts 
right. 
Once the facts are determined, agencies decide what to do given 
those facts. At this second stage, agencies apply some decision rule 
determined either by their own preferences or by the preferences of 
Congress and the president, in some mix. Expertise has no relevance 
at this second stage, which involves the application to the facts of 
values or preferences as to which there may be irreducible conflict or 
disagreement. This is, of course, a hopelessly simplified picture of the 
policymaking process. However, the simplification is useful for my 
purposes, which are legal and normative rather than conceptual. I do 
not aim to give a philosophically adequate account of the elements of 
public choice, but rather to make sense of the relationship between 
agencies and expert panels in the administrative state, under extant 
statutes. As we will see, this distinction between expert fact-finding 
and agency evaluation best reconciles some major features of the 
relevant statutes and of the broader legal landscape. 
 
emergency contraceptive Plan B, despite the fact that two scientific advisory committees had 
overwhelmingly found that the drug was safe and effective.” Id. at 1086–87. 
  9.  Given this comparison between expert panels and agencies, I put aside other 
mechanisms for decisionmaking that might prove superior to both, such as the use of regression-
based algorithms. For an explanation, and evidence that such algorithms outperform experts 
even in tasks saturated with uncertainty, see  PHILIP  E.  TETLOCK, EXPERT  POLITICAL 
JUDGMENT 77 (2005). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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Within this two-stage framework, I focus solely on the first 
stage—the determination of facts. Nothing in the following discussion 
suggests that agencies must defer to expert panels in evaluating the 
outcomes of possible policies. An example involves the recurrent 
question of how agencies should set their regulatory priorities. 
Reviewing courts have afforded agencies broad discretion to allocate 
resources and pick their targets, even where expert advisory panels 
have recommended a course of action.
10 To the extent that agency 
priority-setting and, more generally, agency evaluation of alternative 
policies are premised on factual or causal claims or predictions as to 
which expert panels have been asked to make findings, the analysis 
applies in full. 
A corollary is that I will bracket the question of how much 
political accountability over agency decisionmaking is desirable. For 
any desired level of political accountability, and for any desired 
distribution of policymaking authority among Congress, the 
president, and agencies, it is better, from the social point of view, to 
get facts right than to get them wrong. Congressional and presidential 
preferences may influence the choice of policies, given certain facts, 
but they should not influence the factual component of agency 
decisionmaking. There is no social benefit, and real social cost, when 
an agency claims that a species is numerous when it is actually extinct, 
or claims that the science surrounding climate change is uncertain 
when it is not. If Congress and the president do not think that species 
loss or climate change are problems worth addressing, agencies may 
so decide, subject to the constraints of existing law. But agencies may 
not disguise their policy preferences in the language of fact, a course 
of action that hampers political accountability by making it more 
difficult for legislative and executive principals to monitor the 
agencies.
11 In the framework I suggest, by contrast, agencies would 
have incentives to openly explain their normative differences with 
 
  10. See,  e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (upholding an 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration decision not to make rules to regulate 
occupational exposure to machining fluids, despite an advisory committee’s contrary 
recommendation, on the ground that the agency had rationally set other priorities). On the 
general issue of judicial deference to agency priority-setting, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497, 533–34 (2007); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); Eric Biber, The Importance 
of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 passim (2008). 
  11.  Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998) (“An agency 
should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed even political oversight, by disguising 
its policymaking as factfinding.”). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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expert panels, producing a kind of normative transparency that 
reduces the costs of monitoring their commitments and behavior. 
Of course there is a blurry line between evaluation on the one 
hand and questions of fact on the other;
12 the two components of 
agency policymaking lie on a continuum and are often intertwined. 
When agencies set rates for regulated utilities, the rate that will give a 
reasonable return is a question of policy sitting atop several questions 
of fact. When agencies choose uncertainty parameters for estimates of 
serious risks, the choice of parameter incorporates complex 
judgments about the risk and harms of error in one direction or 
another.
13 Presumptions and burdens of proof and persuasion, as to 
matters of fact, can themselves rest on agency judgments of policy. 
Agencies sometimes blur the categories deliberately, engaging in a 
“science charade”
14 that disguises evaluation as expert fact-finding. 
Nonetheless, there are good pragmatic reasons for using this 
philosophically dubious distinction. The category of questions of fact 
is written into the text
15 and structure of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), and it pervasively shapes the doctrine of 
administrative law, so there is little choice but to make the best of it. 
In many cases, one can untangle value choices from factual, causal, 
and predictive questions, with some work, and there are also many 
clear cases of factual, causal, and predictive judgments. Whether a 
black lung claimant has or will develop pneumoconiosis is 
predominantly a question of fact, causation, or prediction, in any 
ordinary sense of those terms. So too with the question whether 
reducing the permissible level of particulate matter in the air will 
result in less asthma. The line between fact and evaluation is 
sometimes difficult to draw, sometimes not; the difficulty of the line-
drawing exercise is not unique to this area, but it is a challenge across 
all of administrative law. 
 
  12. See  generally  HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY 
AND OTHER ESSAYS (2002). 
  13.  Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative 
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. 
L.J. 729, 748–49 (1979). 
 14.  THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL 
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 269 (2008) (explaining that policymakers are 
“usually quite reluctant” to abandon the “science charade”); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science 
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM.  L.  REV.  1613, 1617 (1995) (describing the 
“‘science charade,’ in which agencies exaggerate scientific contributions in setting toxic 
standards to avoid accountability for underlying policy decisions”). 
  15.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2006). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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A common mechanism by which agencies determine facts, in 
cases of any complexity, is to appeal to expert opinion. Informally, 
the agency may cite studies or simply make claims about the views of 
experts in the field. More formally, the agency may convene an expert 
panel to offer views. In the most important cases, agencies are 
obligated to do so by statute. When revising National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS), EPA must consider the report of its 
permanent Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) and 
explain any departure from the committee’s findings and 
recommendations.
16 Likewise, Congress established an Advisory 
Commission on Childhood Vaccines (ACCV) within the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS). If the secretary of HHS 
receives a recommendation from the Commission, the secretary must 
either conduct a rulemaking in accordance with the recommendation 
or publish a “statement of reasons” for refusing to do so in the 
Federal Register.
17 
The latter class of cases, for which Congress itself has set up 
panels by statute or set constraints on the panels agencies may 
choose, is my central focus. I will not address how expert panels 
should ideally be designed, what rules they should follow, or how 
their memberships should be chosen. Although these questions of 
statutory reform and institutional design are critical,
18 it is also 
important to ask how administrative law and judicial review of agency 
action should be structured given the panels that Congress and the 
agencies have actually set up. As we will see, the structure, 
composition, and procedures that panels use will themselves have 
direct implications for administrative law and judicial review. 
B.  How the Law Stands 
Under administrative law, how does expert consensus or 
disagreement affect agency decisionmaking? Under the APA, several 
legal standards can potentially become relevant in these cases, with a 
great deal of overlap among them. 
In agency proceedings, the default standard of proof is 
preponderance of the evidence,
19 unless statutes specify otherwise. I 
 
  16.  42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2006). 
  17. Id. § 300aa-14(c)(2). 
  18.  For an excellent treatment of statutory reform and institutional design, see MCGARITY 
& WAGNER, supra note 14, at 262–75. 
  19. See,  e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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will assume throughout that this is so, ignoring rare cases in which 
statutes or constitutional rules mandate that agencies decide by clear 
and convincing evidence. Once the agency has made its findings, the 
APA instructs courts to set aside agency decisionmaking that is 
“arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”
20 Agencies must 
always, at a minimum, offer a reasoned basis for their factual findings 
and policy choices. Where proceedings are on the record, however, a 
reviewing court must find substantial evidence for the agency’s 
factual findings.
21 The traditional understanding of the substantial 
evidence standard is that the agency prevails if it offers “such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion,”
22 analogous to the standard of review courts use to 
review jury findings.
23 
It is not at all clear how much, if at all, the substantial evidence 
standard of review for proceedings on the record ultimately differs 
from the general arbitrary or capricious standard. Although refined 
distinctions between these two standards have been drawn, the best 
view, and a widespread one, is that the substantial evidence standard 
is just a more specific application of the general arbitrary and 
capricious standard;
24 in practice, the two tend to collapse into one 
another.
25 Although the Supreme Court has not (yet) formally 
endorsed this collapse,
26 the case law often treats these standards 
loosely, as a general requirement of reasoned fact-finding and 
decisionmaking, and I will do the same. 
In this legal setting, the views of an expert panel will be part of 
the information on which the agency bases its factual findings. Under 
the  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB
27 decision(s), the reviewing 
court is not disabled from looking behind the agency’s findings to the 
 
  20.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
  21. Id. § 706(2)(E). 
  22.  Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
 23.  KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 320 (2008). 
  24.  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
  25. See R ICHARD  J.  PIERCE,  JR.,  SIDNEY  A.  SHAPIRO  &  PAUL  R.  VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 367–69 (3d ed. 1999); WERHAN, supra note 23, at 325 
n.27 (collecting cases). 
  26. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 158 (1999) (noting the question but not resolving 
it).  But see Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983) 
(describing the arbitrary and capricious test as more lenient than the substantial evidence test). 
  27.  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), remanded to 190 F.2d 429 (2d 
Cir. 1951). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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views of the expert factfinder, such as an administrative law judge.
28 
Rather the reviewing court can consider the expert findings as part of 
the record, and overturn the agency’s findings if the agency has 
inadequate reason for rejecting the view of an expert, where the 
agency and expert disagree.
29 Subsequently, I will argue that, under 
the best reading of relevant organic statutes, and the best conception 
of the interaction between those statutes and the APA’s standards for 
judicial review, agencies should be obliged to give a particular type of 
reason—a second-order epistemic reason—for rejecting the views of 
an expert panel on matters of fact, causation, or prediction. Unless 
the agency can give valid reasons to doubt the epistemic quality of the 
panel’s conclusions, those conclusions should outweigh the agency’s 
own judgment. 
How do the APA’s standards apply under the law? What do they 
entail in practice, either when an expert panel reaches consensus, or 
when it has a majority and minority view? At least when an expert 
panel is equally divided, the prevailing rule is that the agency can 
adopt either view. In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley,
30 
the National Marine Fisheries Service appointed a panel of sixteen 
biologists to review scientific data and determine various factual and 
predictive questions bearing on whether the west coast coho salmon 
was a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. As to a 
crucial issue, the panel split 8 to 8. The court accepted, as a settled 
proposition, that “in the event of a scientific disagreement between 
experts, the [agency] is free to rely on the expert opinion of [its] 
choice.”
31 
The precisely equal split on the panel makes the case somewhat 
unusual, however. More often, where experts disagree, a panel 
contains a clear majority view and a dissenting view. Can an agency 
appeal to the majority of an expert panel, or the majority view among 
experts in the field, as support for a determination of fact or of 
causation? I take up this question at length in Parts II and III. The 
short answer is that the cases are somewhat schizophrenic. When 
 
  28. Id. at 488. 
  29.  For an example from the D.C. Circuit discussing American Farm Bureau Federation v. 
EPA, No. 06-1410, 2009 WL 437050 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2009) (per curiam), see infra notes 85, 
91–93. 
  30.  Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998). 
  31. Id.  at 1159; see also, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 
(1972) (setting out this general principle and deferring to Federal Power Commission finding 
where experts gave opposing testimony). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
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agencies are quite formal about counting expert noses, as in the black 
lung cases I will discuss, courts sometimes react in horror, saying that 
nose counting is no substitute for reasoned decisionmaking. Informal 
nose counting, however, goes on all the time. The cases are legion in 
which agencies or, for that matter, reviewing courts appeal vaguely to 
expert consensus or to what most experts or a majority of experts 
hold. As I will argue, there is a good epistemic reason for that 
practice. 
Must an agency follow expert consensus or even the view of a 
majority of experts? As I mentioned, some organic statutes, notably 
the Clean Air Act (CAA), establish an expert panel and require the 
agency to submit its proposed rules to the panel. Although the agency 
is not obligated by statute to do what the panel says, the agency must 
give an adequate reason if it rejects the findings or recommendations 
of a panel majority.
32 Sometimes, courts unthinkingly construe a 
requirement of reason-giving as merely requiring a first-order 
reason—a reasoned statement of the agency’s substantive views about 
the factual, causal, or predictive questions at issue.
33 
I will argue that this is mistaken, and that courts should require 
the agency to give no less than a valid second-order reason: a valid 
argument that the expert panel’s factual findings are epistemically 
suspect, relative to that of the agency. Absent such a second-order 
reason, the views of the expert panel as to factual matters should 
trump the agency’s own first-order judgment, which represents 
nothing more than another expert vote and, as such, is defeated by 
the expert consensus or (super)majority view to the contrary, when 
that exists. Nothing in my analysis, however, implies that agencies 
must defer to a panel’s view about how alternative policies should be 
evaluated, given the facts. As to that question, the agency’s judgment 
controls, insofar as the law permits. The consequence is that the 
agency will have an incentive to be clear when its decisions are based 
on evaluative differences with the panel, thus making the agency’s 
normative commitments transparent to outside monitors—namely, 
Congress, courts, and the public. 
Interestingly, although the voting rules for such panels are 
usually left unclear, a simple majority of experts, rather than a 
supermajority, is usually assumed to be controlling, not in the sense 
that it can bind the agency without more, but in the sense that a 
 
  32.  42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2006). 
  33. See,  e.g., Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007). VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC 6/24/2009  8:56:48 AM 
2009]  PARLIAMENT OF THE EXPERTS 2243 
majority is entitled to state the view of the panel. As we will see, there 
is a sound epistemic reason for this assumption. Under a broad range 
of conditions, the views of a simple majority of experts are more 
likely to be correct than the views of any other subgroup; requiring a 
supermajority of experts on the panel to agree in order to force the 
agency to respond with reasons would, effectively, privilege the views 
of a lesser subgroup with bad epistemic consequences. 
II.  WHEN AGENCIES MAY COUNT NOSES 
If the weight of expert opinion on the panel is X, is that an 
adequately reasoned basis for the agency to find that X is the case? 
For purposes of administrative law, the question is whether nose 
counting amounts to nonarbitrary fact-finding in cases off the record, 
or whether nose counting provides substantial evidence in cases on 
the record. As these standards largely overlap, I will refer, for brevity, 
to the agency’s obligation to engage in reasoned fact-finding. 
A.  An Example: Black Lung Benefits 
Consider the dilemma that faces administrative law judges 
deciding cases under the Black Lung Benefits Act.
34 Roughly, the 
statute gives coal miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis, or black 
lung disease, a claim for benefits against the employer if the miners or 
their survivors can show, among other things, that the miner 
contracted pneumoconiosis and that the condition caused death or 
disability.
35 Administrative law judges, often faced with conflicting 
diagnoses from doctors who specialize in black lung problems, 
constantly attempt to resolve the cases by counting noses. And the 
courts repeatedly rebuke them for doing so. 
In a rather typical case, Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co.,
36 five 
doctors offered opinions on whether the claimant had 
pneumoconiosis. The administrative law judge held that, because the 
five doctors were equally qualified, numbers should prevail; because 
three of the five had found that pneumoconiosis was not present, the 
finding went against the claimant.
37 The Seventh Circuit said that this 
was unreasoned decisionmaking. Because a “scientific dispute must 
 
  34.  30 U.S.C. §§ 901–45 (2006). 
  35. Id. § 901(a). 
  36.  Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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be resolved on scientific grounds,”
38 the court underscored that 
administrative law judges “must have a medical reason for preferring 
one physician’s conclusion over another’s.”
39 The judge: 
cannot avoid the scientific controversy by basing his decision on 
which side had more medical opinions in its favor. This unreasoned 
approach, which amounts to nothing more than a ‘mechanical nose 
count of witnesses,’ would promote a quantity-over-quality 
approach to expert retention, requiring parties to engage in a race to 
hire experts to ensure victory.
40 
The concern expressed in the last clause, about the effects of 
different decisionmaking strategies where the number of experts is up 
for grabs, is a useful and potentially valid point that I will take up in 
Part III below. The rest of the analysis is erroneous, although, to be 
fair, the decision was for the most part following established circuit 
precedent.
41 It is too demanding to require the administrative law 
judge to give a first-order medical reason sufficient to arbitrate 
between the conflicting diagnoses of two groups of experts in the 
field. “Avoiding the scientific controversy” is not a moral failing on 
the part of the lay decisionmaker faced with expert disagreement; it is 
a perfectly sensible epistemic strategy for lay decisionmakers who 
lack first-order competence. The administrative law judges’ medical 
conclusions lack any firm epistemic basis, whereas counting the noses 
of experts has a clear epistemic rationale. 
B. Why  Count  Noses? 
The affirmative basis for counting noses is the theory of 
decisionmaking under risk and uncertainty. Optimal decisionmaking 
requires optimal information gathering. The agency’s problem is to 
find facts correctly, but it cannot invest unlimited resources in doing 
so. By counting the noses of experts, under certain conditions, the 
agency will be able to maximize the overall quality of its decisions, 
taking into account both the accuracy of its decisions and the costs of 
decisionmaking. 
 
  38. Id. (quoting Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
  39. Id. (quoting McCandless, 255 F.3d at 469). 
  40. Id. (quoting Sahara Coal Co. v. Fitts, 39 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
  41. See,  e.g., Livermore v. Amax Coal Co., 297 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2002); McCandless, 
255 F.3d at 468–69; Fitts, 39 F.3d at 782; Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 
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What are those conditions? In particular, why should a vote of 
experts be thought more epistemically reliable than the agency’s own 
views? The answer lies in the rational choice theory of committee 
decisionmaking. For present purposes, this body of theory can be 
divided into two branches, involving the aggregation of information 
that panel members possess and the acquisition of information by 
those members. 
I will begin with the aggregation question, best approached 
through the lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Roughly, assume a 
group of sincere voters—voters trying to get the right answer—whose 
competence is, on average,
42 at least slightly better than random. With 
two choices,
43 the voters are slightly more likely to be correct than 
incorrect. In order to bracket the issue of information acquisition, 
assume for the moment that the voters’ level of competence is 
exogenous; it is just there. 
The Jury Theorem then shows that a majority vote of this group 
is increasingly likely to be correct as the size of the group increases, as 
the average competence of its members increases, or as its cognitive 
diversity increases, when diversity means that the biases of the 
group’s members are negatively correlated.
44 When the voters are 
themselves experts, the second two conditions—competence and 
diversity—tend to work at cross-purposes. Experts tend to have high 
individual competence, but may also have highly correlated biases, 
perhaps because of common professional training or because they 
copy each other’s opinions. I return to these issues shortly. 
For now, the key point is just that majority voting most 
effectively aggregates the information dispersed among the panel of 
experts. Nose counting of the assembled experts is a means by which 
the agency can in effect aggregate expert views, even if the agency 
itself lacks first-order competence. The conceptual mistake in 
critiques of nose counting is the idea that, if the agency lacks first-
order reasons for its findings, it must be acting in an unreasoned way. 
 
  42. See  Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen & Scott L. Feld, Thirteen Theorems in Search 
of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 273–74 (1983). 
  43.  The Theorem can be extended to more than two choices, but as nothing in my 
discussion depends on this wrinkle, I will assume the two-option case. Note that at least some 
multiple-option cases can be reduced to two-option cases through successive pairwise 
comparison. 
  44.  Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Some Microfoundations of Collective Wisdom 7 (May 12, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://telechargeu.cines.fr/3517/load/documents// 
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But if the agency’s nose counting is itself a rational second-order 
epistemic strategy, the critique collapses. 
The Jury Theorem can be extended to qualified majority, or 
supermajority rules, but only with restrictions.
45 It has been shown 
that qualified majority rules maximize the probability of making a 
correct decision, but only if the status quo is stipulated to prevail in 
the event that no alternative garners the requisite supermajority.
46 
This is a suspect condition in the administrative state, where the 
regulatory status quo—which may just be the default common law 
baseline—has no necessary priority, either in theory
47 or under the 
terms of the APA.
48 If the status quo preference is abandoned, then a 
weaker result holds: “for sufficiently large [decisionmaking 
groups] . . . if the average competence of the voters is greater than the 
fraction of the votes needed for passage . . . a group decision is more 
likely to be correct than the decision of a single randomly chosen 
individual.”
49 This condition is stringent; if the decisionmaking group 
uses a two-thirds majority rule, for example, then average 
competence must be at least .67. Absent these conditions, the 
background logic of the Jury Theorem is that majority voting is 
epistemically preferred. Any lesser subgroup of decisionmakers is less 
likely to be correct, given the Theorem’s other conditions; and 
majority voting alone gives no privilege to the status quo, in line with 
the administrative state’s general assumption that failure to regulate 
when regulation is justified is as dangerous as unjustified regulation. 
The problem of acquiring information merits a brief discussion. 
The standard treatment of the Jury Theorem assumes that 
information is exogenous. If this assumption is relaxed, it is apparent 
that there is a tradeoff between the number of experts and the 
epistemic quality of their views. If information is exogenous, then the 
more experts, the more likely it is that the group decision will be 
 
  45.  This paragraph is adapted from Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal 
Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009). 
  46.  Ruth C. Ben-Yashar & Shmuel I. Nitzan, The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size 
Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result, 38 INT’L ECON. REV. 175, 
179–83 (1997). 
 47.  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 656–57 (1985). 
  48.  APA provisions treat agency action and inaction equivalently. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 
706(1) (2006). In practice, however, reviewing courts are more reluctant to force agency action 
than to block it. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
 49.  Mark  Fey,  A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority Voting Rules, 20 
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accurate, so long as each is at least slightly better than random and 
holding all else constant. However, when experts must decide how 
much information to acquire—how much epistemic effort to invest in 
the panel’s activities—increasing numbers make each expert less 
likely to be the decisive vote, which reduces the effort each will 
expend. Increasing panel size need not increase the aggregate 
information panelists hold, because less information will be 
acquired.
50 In short, with endogenous information, experts have an 
incentive to engage in epistemic free-riding.
51 
This problem has at least three consequences. First, it creates an 
optimization problem: institutional designers setting up committees 
must trade off the quantity of panelists against the quality of their 
contributions and votes.
52 In most of the real-world cases I discuss, 
however, Congress has set or capped the number of panel members, 
or the agency has done so before the agency action giving rise to the 
litigation, or the number is extrinsically determined in some other 
way. I will thus bracket this set of issues. Second, the danger of 
epistemic free-riding within the panel may give agencies good second-
order reasons to reject the panel’s recommendations, under 
conditions where the problem is especially likely to be serious. I 
return to these problems below. 
Finally, the problem of endogenous information provides further 
reason to think that majority rule is the best voting rule for expert 
panels and the best nose counting rule for agencies attempting to take 
advantage of expert opinion, at least where experts face highly 
complex regulatory problems. It has been shown that, as the quality 
of information decreases, so that each voter will get a very imperfect 
idea of the truth even after investing effort, the optimal voting rule 
will fall from unanimity down toward simple majority.
53 The basic 
intuition is that the larger the supermajority needed to make a 
decision, such as making a finding for the agency to use, the less each 
panelist will invest in acquiring information, because the imperfection 
 
  50.  For this reason, polling the members of the National Academy of Sciences about a 
relevant problem might well yield less information than voting within a small panel of experts 
focused on the same problem. Thanks to Stuart Benjamin for raising this issue. 
  51.  Christian List & Philip Pettit, An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem?, in KARL POPPER: 
CRITICAL APPRAISALS 128, 138–40 (Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald eds., 2004). 
  52.  Drora Karotkin & Jacob Paroush, Optimum Committee Size: Quality-Versus-Quantity 
Dilemma, 20 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 429, 433 (2003). 
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of the information acquired makes it less likely that any individual 
panelist will be decisive. (Imagine sitting on a twelve-member panel 
that requires a unanimous vote to act. A vote only matters if all 
eleven others vote identically. If the facts are highly unclear, what are 
the chances that everyone will vote the same way?) If the panel faces 
an extremely blurry informational environment, as it does in most of 
the hard regulatory problems for which Congress or the agency has 
thought an expert panel necessary, then a voting rule approaching 
simple majority is likely to be best. 
A similar point holds if the concern is not that experts fail to 
invest in acquiring information, but rather that experts will 
manipulate or distort the information they already possess in order to 
produce preferred outcomes. In one illuminating model of a 
deliberative expert committee,
54 majority rule induces the members to 
reveal their private information with less distortion than under 
unanimity.
55 The reason is that if a unanimous vote is necessary to 
depart from the status quo, then members biased in favor of change 
have strong incentives to overclaim or otherwise manipulate their 
information. By contrast, majority rule minimizes the net incentives 
for distortion by panel members with different biases for and against 
change. 
C. Alternatives 
Nose counting is hardly the only second-order epistemic strategy 
that the lay decisionmaker can use when confronted with 
disagreement among experts. Nose counting is just one such strategy 
among many. The decisionmaker can examine the relative 
qualifications of the experts, giving greater weight to the more highly 
qualified; the Stalcup court’s opaque preference for a qualitative 
approach suggests this,
56 and other cases are more explicit that 
qualification weighing counts as adequately reasoned decisionmaking 
in black lung cases where expert diagnoses disagree.
57 Another 
 
  54.  David Austen-Smith & Timothy J. Feddersen, Deliberation and Voting Rules, in 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS 269 passim (David Austen-Smith & John Duggan 
eds., 2005); see also David Austen-Smith & Timothy J. Feddersen, Deliberation, Preference 
Uncertainty, and Voting Rules, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 209, 210 (2006). 
 55.  Austen-Smith  &  Fedderson,  Deliberation and Voting Rules, supra note 54, at 273. 
  56.  Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007). 
  57. See,  e.g., Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The ALJ 
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approach is to examine the track records of different experts to see 
whether their diagnoses were later proven true or false. Finally, the 
decisionmaker can discount expert views by the known or apparent 
biases of experts, who may have self-interested reasons for opining 
one way or another. Where a company doctor diagnoses no disease, 
and an independent doctor appointed by the court finds to the 
contrary, the result is not a tie. 
But the fact that nose counting is only one second-order 
epistemic strategy for choosing among the conflicting views of experts 
does not show that there is anything wrong with nose counting. 
Depending upon the situation, it may be a perfectly sensible 
approach, and indeed perhaps the only available approach. On the 
facts of Stalcup, for example, the other strategies were unavailable. 
The experts were equally qualified, and there is nothing in the 
reported facts suggesting that some had better track records than 
others. In regulatory domains of higher uncertainty and complexity 
than the black lung cases, experts are especially likely to lack clear 
track records because it will usually be unclear whether experts’ past 
causal judgments and predictions were accurate. 
In some cases, then, there is no real alternative to nose counting. 
This is not an unusual situation; it is a chronic condition in lay 
decisionmaking on subjects as to which expertise is relevant, but 
experts disagree. The lay decisionmaker knows that the majority of 
experts might be wrong, but placing one’s epistemic bets with the 
majority is still better than placing them with the minority. Implicit 
nose counting thus goes on all the time. When a patient gets a second 
opinion that disagrees with the first, a common recourse is to seek a 
third opinion to break the tie. Captains of the age of sail would bring 
three compasses to sea; in case the readings given by the first two 
conflicted, the third would be consulted.
58 And judicial opinions 
themselves constantly refer, in an untheorized way, to the views of “a 
majority of experts” or “a majority of studies” to buttress their factual 
claims.
59 
 
[conclusion].”); Adkins v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 958 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 
1992) (“[T]he ALJ must give some reasoned explanation why [the expert’s] superior 
qualifications do not carry the day.”). 
  58.  I thank Jon Elster for making this point to me. 
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Indeed, implicit nose counting also underpins the common but 
untheorized agency practice in which agencies appeal to expert 
consensus as a sufficient reason for taking facts as established. Such 
an appeal effectively says that the unanimous view of experts is 
sufficient reason to take a fact or causal theory as established; this is 
just as much a case of nose counting as an appeal to a majority view 
of experts. But if first-order reasons were the only permissible 
reasons, the difference between unanimity and majority should make 
no difference. The logic of cases like Stalcup is that administrative 
decisionmakers should not be able to appeal to expert consensus 
either—they should have to disgorge their first-order judgments, 
whether or not the experts have achieved consensus—but this is 
preposterous. 
D.  Nose Counting in Regulatory Rulemaking 
The black lung cases involve administration of a benefits scheme. 
In marked contrast to those cases, in which nose counting is said to be 
impermissible, nose counting by both agencies and reviewing courts is 
ubiquitous in regulatory rulemaking. The practice, however, is almost 
wholly untheorized. 
In American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA,
60 the D.C. Circuit reviewed 
EPA’s 1997 revision of the NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter. 
In an initial round of litigation, the D.C. Circuit had invalidated the 
rulemaking on constitutional nondelegation grounds, only to be 
reversed by the Supreme Court.
61 On remand, the D.C. Circuit upheld 
the rules under standard arbitrariness review. Notably, EPA had 
justified its choices not only by first-order reasons, but also by nose 
counting. One key feature of the rules, EPA pointed out, was within a 
range thought desirable by “most CASAC  .  .  .  members.”
62 As to 
another key feature, “EPA . . . emphasized that CASAC unanimously 
agreed with the proposed change.”
63 The court followed suit, 
upholding the EPA’s decisions in part because the court thought that 
the agency’s nose counting was a perfectly sound sort of reason for 
the agency to give. As to one issue, the court specifically cited EPA’s 
appeal to CASAC consensus, calling it “record evidence” that helped 
 
  60.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
  61.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Whitman 
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
  62. Am.  Trucking  Ass’ns, 283 F.3d at 367. 
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the agency meet its burden of reasoned fact-finding and 
decisionmaking.
64 As to another issue, on which CASAC did not 
reach consensus, the court noted that EPA had followed the majority 
view.
65 
The opinion on remand in American Trucking is eminently 
sensible, and it exemplifies an epistemic strategy that is routine for 
agencies and courts. Current administrative law is inconsistent about 
whether nose counting is an adequate basis for fact-finding for 
purposes of APA review, with the black lung cases saying that it is not 
and cases like American Trucking suggesting that it is. I believe the 
second view is generally correct. 
III.  WHEN NOSE COUNTING IS INADEQUATE 
Despite these points, and compatible with them, it is also true 
that nose counting is inadequate under a narrow set of identifiable 
conditions, and should be ruled out as a valid basis for agency fact-
finding and decisionmaking. I will identify two such conditions: when 
nose counting would create incentives for costly strategic behavior by 
litigants or agencies, and when there is a demonstrable risk of biased 
decisionmaking or harmful groupthink on expert panels. Let us 
discuss these in turn. 
A.  Endogenous Panels and Strategic Behavior 
The Stalcup court offered the valid concern that nose counting 
“would promote a quantity-over-quality approach to expert retention, 
requiring parties to engage in a race to hire experts to insure 
victory.”
66 Where the very size of the panel is itself a variable that the 
parties or the agency can choose, and can choose during litigation or 
in the shadow of litigation, then the number of noses to be counted is 
endogenous. In the worst version, parties or agencies will add experts 
after seeing what earlier experts have said, in order to generate a 
desired result. 
Such concerns, however, need not entail that nose counting is 
altogether impermissible. In many, perhaps most, cases of agency 
nose counting, the panel’s number and composition is set or 
constrained by statute, agency rule, or policy well before agencies 
 
  64. Id. at 378. 
  65. Id. at 379. 
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have found relevant facts in support of a proposed rule or order, and 
before litigation ensues. Under standard principles of administrative 
law, an agency directive creating a panel is binding upon the agency 
unless and until changed through proper procedures.
67 And, as a 
backup safeguard, courts can apply greater scrutiny to panels whose 
number or composition the agency has determined after litigation has 
commenced.
68 In such cases, the scope for strategic behavior is small 
or nonexistent; the panel can safely be treated by reviewing courts as 
entirely exogenous. 
What makes the problem a real one in the black lung setting, and 
in other settings in which agencies award statutory benefits or impose 
statutory penalties conditioned on adjudicative facts, is that the 
parties themselves hire experts after seeing what the other side’s 
experts have said, or what their own experts have said, and after 
seeing how many experts the other side has hired. In such settings, 
rational parties will invest in hiring additional experts up to the point 
at which the marginal increase in the expected payoff equals the 
marginal cost of hiring the next expert. There is also a serious risk 
that later experts will simply free-ride on the conclusion of earlier 
experts, as I will discuss shortly. 
Here too, however, making nose counting impermissible is 
unnecessary. The simpler approach is to require parties to use a 
standard operating procedure, familiar from arbitration, in which the 
number of experts is determined in advance, behind a veil of 
ignorance about what the experts will say. Whether agency 
adjudicators or reviewing courts have the authority to do this will of 
course depend upon the details of the statutory scheme, but there is 
no objection in principle. Here the core problem is not with nose 
counting as such, but with strategic behavior. The problem can be 
attacked on its own terms, without an overbroad prohibition on an 
epistemically sensible strategy of second-order reasoning. 
Moreover, the Stalcup court’s concern about strategic behavior, 
however valid in itself, just identifies a collateral systemic cost that 
can arise from nose counting. It is a separate question whether that 
cost outweighs the epistemic benefits. A system or practice with both 
 
  67. See  Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389–90 
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nose counting and some degree of strategic behavior may be superior 
overall to a system or practice with neither feature. If the agency has 
a reason for thinking that the benefits outweigh the costs, that reason 
is itself subject to the APA’s usual standards of review, and courts 
should uphold it so long as it is nonarbitrary. 
Finally, I speculate, without hard evidence, that nose counting is 
impossible to eliminate altogether. Agencies or agency adjudicators 
who are basically at sea—who rationally lack any confidence in their 
own first-order judgments, for example, the sort of medical judgments 
that the Stalcup court oddly required agency adjudicators to give—
may implicitly count noses for lack of a better alternative, as indeed 
judges sometimes do as well. In such cases, making nose counting 
impermissible will simply drive agencies to conceal the real bases for 
their fact-finding. Nose counting is a ubiquitous epistemic strategy, 
both in ordinary life and in official decisionmaking, and 
administrative law has no real choice but to accommodate it. 
B.  Judgment Falsification and Groupthink 
Part of the judicial concern about nose counting may rest on an 
intuitive concern about false consensus, herding, or groupthink by 
experts. In a Jury Theorem framework, the concern is that a group of 
experts in a given field will have highly correlated biases, because of 
common professional training, because they copy each other’s 
opinions, or even because the expert panel fakes an appearance of 
consensus for public consumption; in the last case, experts will not be 
voting sincerely, which undermines the operation of the Theorem. 
Common professional training is a built-in hazard of expert 
panels drawn from a scientific field or subfield. Copying may occur 
because of an “information cascade,” in which individual experts 
rationally use the views of other experts as the basis for forming their 
own views, thus reducing the number of independent opinions 
expressed by the group overall. Here there is a kind of epistemic free-
riding
69 or “cognitive loafing,”
70 as some within the group benefit from 
the information provided by other’s views without contributing 
information themselves. Copying may also occur because of a 
 
  69. See  List & Pettit, supra note 51, at 138–40. 
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“reputational cascade,”
71 in which experts follow the views of senior 
scientists or powerful figures in the field, for fear of being stamped as 
incompetent or odd. 
As to the falsification of expert judgments, case studies have 
shown that expert panels sometimes gin up a consensus that does not 
actually exist.
72 The panel may do this in order to maximize its 
members’ joint influence on agencies and other decisionmakers, or 
out of paternalistic concern that the agency or public will become 
confused if the panel ventilates its disputes, or because the panel’s 
members have a professional interest in preserving a public 
reputation for expertise.
73 When this occurs, some panel members are 
falsifying their judgments, and the panel as a whole conceals 
information—about the presence and magnitude of expert 
disagreement—that is useful for decisionmakers. 
C.  The Conditions for Expert Groupthink 
Whether such concerns are serious depends upon the 
composition, structure, and decisionmaking process of the expert 
panel. What factors make groupthink or judgment falsification more 
or less likely? I will use groupthink, itself an ill-defined notion, as 
shorthand for the various forms of epistemic free-riding, 
informational and reputational cascades, and falsification of 
judgments I have mentioned. Although the problems are somewhat 
different, the institutional determinants of the various types of 
groupthink overlap a great deal. 
First, groupthink is less likely to occur as the diversity of panel 
membership increases.
74 Many panels are chosen uniformly from 
specialists in relevant scientific subfields, like the panel of scientists in 
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley.
75 In other cases, statutes 
require that expert panels contain professionals from different fields, 
or even nonprofessionals,
76 and these can be understood as means for 
diversifying the panel’s training, assumptions, and intellectual 
 
  71.  Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683, 685–89, 727–28 (1999). 
 72.  John  Beatty,  Masking Disagreement Among Experts, 3 EPISTEME 52, 55 (2006). 
  73. Id. at 53–54. See generally Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, On Committees of Experts, 
122 Q.J. ECON. 337 (2007) (showing conditions under which a panel of experts concerned for 
their individual reputations will generate false consensus). 
 74.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 141–44 (2003). 
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outlook. In Jury Theorem terms, this approach trades off reduced 
average competence, because diversification requires that some 
specialists in the subfield must be bumped off a panel of fixed size, for 
reduced correlation of biases across the group. Depending upon the 
precise composition, the benefits of reduced correlation can more 
than compensate for the loss, in which case some degree of 
diversification will be epistemically optimal.
77 I return to these issues 
shortly. 
Another major cause of groupthink is sequential, rather than 
simultaneous, expression of views among the panel experts. If experts 
express their judgments in ignorance of other experts’ judgments, 
herding and cascades are ruled out, although false consensus arising 
from experts’ concern for reputation is still possible.
78 Ideally, experts 
should vote simultaneously rather than sequentially, in order to 
prevent informational and reputational cascades. In real-world 
conditions, however, simultaneity is difficult to achieve; deliberation 
prior to voting will give experts a sense of where other experts stand. 
These tensions are on display in a set of guidelines issued by the Food 
and Drug Administration for its many expert advisory committees.
79 
On the one hand, the guidelines expressly recommend simultaneous 
voting, citing the academic literature on the risks of information 
cascades.
80 On the other hand, the guidelines recommend extensive 
deliberation before voting, and recommend against the use of secret 
ballots,
81 which can help block reputational cascades by preventing 
panel members from knowing how others voted. 
The structure of experts’ compensation is also important. If 
experts receive no compensation or merely nominal compensation, as 
is the case with many scientific panels, then the incentives for 
 
  77.  Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 629 (1992). 
  78.  For a model in which expert panels, voting simultaneously, nonetheless generate false 
consensus, see Visser & Swank, supra note 73. The basic mechanism in the model is that experts 
believe that the audience believes that competent experts will all have the same view of the 
facts, in which case disagreement among the panel implies that some of its members are less 
competent. On further assumptions, this causes the minority to go along with the majority even 
if the minority disagrees. This mechanism is unaffected by the simultaneity of voting. 
  79. See  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE 
FOR FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND FDA STAFF: VOTING PROCEDURES FOR 
ADVISORY  COMMITTEE  MEETINGS (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/ 
GuidancePolicyRegs/ACVotingFINALGuidance080408.pdf. 
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epistemic free-riding or cognitive loafing are at a maximum, 
increasing the risks of herding within the panel. Even if experts are 
rewarded for their own performance, information cascades are still a 
risk, because in an information cascade, it is individually rational to 
follow the views of a sufficient number of others, even if one’s private 
information is to the contrary. Both theory
82 and experiments
83 
suggest that the best way to prevent information cascades from 
forming is to reward individuals on the basis of the accuracy of a 
majority vote within the group, rather than for individual accuracy. 
Under this reward structure, the individual’s incentive is to reveal 
private information to the group, maximizing the chance that (a 
majority of) the group as a whole will make the correct decision. 
All this said, however, the groupthink concern does not show 
that nose counting is necessarily an impermissible epistemic strategy 
for agencies. What it shows is that agencies and reviewing courts will 
sometimes have valid second-order, epistemic reasons for discounting 
the views of an expert consensus or an expert majority. I turn to such 
cases in Part IV. In other cases, however, such concerns are not 
implicated; or, if they are implicated, the agency may still rationally 
decide that nose counting is a better epistemic strategy than the 
available alternatives. Where either of these conditions is met, there 
is nothing wrong with nose counting of experts by agencies. 
D. Conclusion 
I conclude that a factual finding based upon nose counting of 
experts should count as an adequately reasoned decision, absent 
special reason for second-order concern about strategic behavior, 
judgment falsification, or expert groupthink. When those conditions 
do not hold, nose counting is a valid basis for decision within the 
terms of the APA.
84 The court’s basic error in cases like Stalcup is to 
think that first-order reasons—the administrative law judge’s medical 
conclusions, issued in the face of expert disagreement—are the only 
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sort of reasons that administrative law can recognize. Nothing in the 
Act, in the conceptual framework of administrative law, or in the 
theory of rational decisionmaking requires this exclusion of second-
order reasons. Nose counting of experts is a ubiquitous second-order 
strategy for lay decisionmakers; although it is not the only such 
strategy, there is often no alternative. To force lay decisionmakers, in 
such cases, to arbitrate an expert disagreement by coughing up a first-
order reason for which they lack any epistemic foundation is itself a 
guarantee of unreasoned decisionmaking. 
IV.  WHEN AGENCIES MUST COUNT NOSES 
So far we have discussed cases in which agencies use nose 
counting as a reason for their decisions, and courts review whether 
the reason is adequate. By contrast, there are also important cases in 
which agencies wish to depart from the majority or supermajority 
view of an expert panel, as to matters of fact, causation, or prediction. 
Should they be allowed to do so? Under what conditions, and based 
on what reasons? 
A.  An Example: Fine Particulate Matter 
A well-known example of this problem, during the Bush 
administration, was EPA’s 2006 decision to reject the CASAC 
recommendations about the revision of the NAAQS for fine 
particulate matter.
85 CASAC, following a 20 to 2 vote of its subpanel 
on particulate matter, recommended an annual standard between 
twelve and fourteen micrograms per cubic meter, but EPA rejected 
the recommendation and maintained the extant annual standard of 
fifteen micrograms. This was the first time that EPA had ever directly 
rejected a CASAC recommendation in the NAAQS revision process. 
A section of the CAA obligates an administrator to explain why 
proposed rules “differ[] in any important respect from any 
of . . . [CASAC’s]  recommendations.”
86 The administrator explained 
the EPA’s 2006 rejection on several grounds: (1) the agency’s choice 
 
  85.  The 2006 NAAQS regulations that resulted were successfully challenged, so far as 
relevant here, in the D.C. Circuit by a coalition of state attorneys general and health and 
environmental groups. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, No. 06-1410, 2009 WL 437050, at 
*6 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2009) (per curiam) (overturning the EPA’s decision as to the annual 
standard for fine particulate matter on the ground that EPA failed to adequately explain its 
decision). 
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was based on its own view of “the most directly relevant body of 
scientific studies,”
87 (2) CASAC saw less scientific uncertainty than 
the Administrator thought was actually present,
88 and (3) the CASAC 
recommendation was not unanimous, because two of twenty-two 
members of the particulate matter panel dissented.
89 Compressing 
these grounds somewhat, we may understand the administrator as 
giving two types of reasons for departing from CASAC’s findings and 
recommendation: (1) first-order scientific reasons based on the 
agency’s own expertise—in this case its expert assessment of the best 
available science, and of the level of scientific uncertainty—and (2) 
the second-order reason, offered to diminish the epistemic force of 
the panel’s conclusions—that the panel was not unanimous, implying 
that reasonable experts could disagree. 
I will suggest that neither type of reason was sufficient to justify 
rejecting the panel’s factual findings. The former is just the 
administrator’s first-order view, and has no special epistemic status;
90 
the latter is, in these circumstances, an invalid second-order 
argument. Lacking any valid reason for departing from the panel’s 
findings, the administrator violated the CAA. In order to prevail, the 
administrator would have had to either give a valid second-order 
reason for rejecting the panel’s factual findings, or else show that the 
agency’s regulatory priorities or evaluation of alternative policies 
were an adequate basis for disagreement. In the latter case, the 
administrator would have had to make transparent EPA’s normative 
differences with the panel, making it easier for Congress, the courts, 
and the public to monitor the agency’s commitments and behavior. 
As it turned out, the D.C. Circuit recently overturned the 
administrator’s decision as to the annual standard for fine particulate 
matter, finding that the administrator “failed adequately to explain its 
reason for not accepting the CASAC’s recommendations.”
91 The 
court’s analytic framework was somewhat different than the one I 
 
  87.  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144, 
61,174 (Oct. 17, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2008)). 
  88. Id. 
  89. Id. at 61, 174 n.44. 
  90.  Again, the administrator’s superior democratic credentials might entitle him to 
evaluate alternative policies within the bounds Congress has set out, but they are no basis for 
according his judgments of fact, causation, or prediction superior status to those of (other) 
experts. My discussion is confined to the latter point. 
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suggest because the court said that the administrator’s technical 
expertise deserves deference,
92 but in practice the court seemed to 
weigh the technical expertise of CASAC more heavily,
93 consistent 
with the analysis here. 
B.  Expert Disagreement and First-Order Reasons 
Contrary to current law, I suggest that the administrator’s first-
order view of the scientific merits should have no special weight as 
against a panel’s factual findings. Administrators are experts, at least 
in the sense that their views are typically informed by the expertise of 
staff scientists (although as we will see, this is not always true, and 
was not true in the particulate matter rulemaking). But the members 
of the scientific panel are expert as well. The administrator’s view 
should thus be understood to count as just another vote among 
others. If the expert panel is tied, it follows that the agency’s vote is 
decisive and the agency can choose either view, as the court held in 
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley. If, however, a decisive 
majority of experts favors a certain view, then the administrator’s 
contrary view is simply another vote for the dissenting side, and as 
such is defeated.
94 
This approach is entirely consistent with believing—if anyone 
does believe this—that the administrator is the single most competent 
expert in the picture. A main point of the Jury Theorem is that a 
group of somewhat less expert voters, so long as their competence is 
better than random, can be markedly superior to a single expert of 
higher competence. Indeed, under identifiable conditions, the 
accuracy of the group’s median or mean member will necessarily 
exceed that of its single most competent member.
95 
The agency can, of course, hear what the panel has to say, review 
its methods and conclusions, and then form its own judgments. This 
 
  92. See  id. at *14. As I explain below, my suggestion is not that the administrator lacks 
expertise, but that the administrator should be understood to have only one vote in the 
parliament of the experts. 
  93. See  id. slip op. at *7–*10 (noting disagreements between CASAC and EPA, and finding 
that EPA had not adequately explained why its judgments should trump those of CASAC). 
  94.  This approach creates a discontinuity: where the expert panel is tied the administrator 
necessarily prevails, but not otherwise, so the switch of a small number of votes on the panel can 
in theory be dispositive for the outcome. This is, however, a standard property of majority 
rule—under May’s Theorem, it is one of the conditions that majority rule can alone satisfy 
jointly—and it is a routine property of majority voting in legislatures. 
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does not show that the agency’s conclusions can incorporate all of the 
panel’s expertise, and add to it the agency’s own. To see this, imagine 
that the administrator is placed on the panel; some statutory panels, 
set up to advise a given agency, do include the heads of other agencies 
or government officials. In such circumstances, the administrator 
could likewise consider the information available to other panel 
members, but the administrator would merely have one vote among 
others, and a contrary majority view of experts would trump that 
vote. I suggest that the same logic holds when statutes require the 
administrator to consider the panel’s factual findings and to give a 
reason for departing from them. In such cases, the agency’s own first-
order view of the facts should not suffice to trump the panel’s 
aggregate expertise. 
C.  Ex Ante Incentives 
In principle, it is possible that members of expert panels might 
invest less in acquiring information when, and because, agencies defer 
to them on factual questions. If the agency must accept the panel’s 
work, the panel might do it less carefully. Yet the opposite effect 
seems at least equally possible: expert panels who know they will 
receive no deference have little incentive to get things right, whereas 
expert panels may invest more time in acquiring information precisely 
when, and because, they know that the agency is presumptively 
obliged to accept their findings. Requiring agency deference to panel 
findings, in other words, eliminates a kind of epistemic moral hazard
96 
that can arise when the panel is aware that the agency is likely to 
ignore its work. In light of this point, the ex ante incentives of the 
framework suggested here are ambiguous and unclear; at a minimum, 
there is no ground for concern that the framework will systematically 
undermine expert panels’ incentives to acquire information. 
D. Disaggregating  Agencies 
This analysis assumes that it is best to treat the agency head as an 
expert, whose view is to count for one but also for no more than one.
97 
 
  96. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 95–96 (2009) (“Legislators 
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I do not, however, defend the very different claim that reviewing 
courts should ignore internal expert staff who make 
recommendations to the agency head. Under the Universal Camera 
approach, the findings of internal experts, such as agency technical 
staff,
98 are themselves part of the record. By parallel, the view of 
internal expert staff should be taken to be part of a larger, albeit 
virtual, expert panel composed of both outside expert advisory panels 
and career experts internal to the agency—the full parliament of 
experts. 
This yields several possible cases. In the easiest case, expert staff 
within the agency take the same view as outside expert panels, and 
both are opposed by the agency head, who is a political appointee. 
During EPA’s 2006 revisions of the fine particulate matter standards, 
the agency’s expert staff made findings in accord with CASAC’s 
findings, and the administrator rejected both.
99 Here, adding the votes 
of the internal experts to those of the expert advisory panel would, at 
most, increase the size of the expert supermajority opposing the 
agency’s view. That view would be overridden anyway under the 
approach I have suggested, unless the agency has a valid second-order 
reason for thinking that the expert panel’s conclusions were 
epistemically informed. Including internal agency staff in the 
parliament of experts makes no difference in such cases. 
There are two harder cases, however. In the first hard case, the 
internal experts support an agency’s view, and both are contradicted 
by an outside expert panel. Suppose that an expert panel composed of 
ten members splits, 6 to 4, in favor of a certain finding of fact. 
Suppose also that the agency head, considering the views of three 
internal experts, believes the finding is incorrect. Is the count 6 to 5 in 
favor of the finding, because the agency counts for one? Or is it 8 to 6 
against the finding, because one must count not only the agency’s own 
vote, but also the votes of the three internal experts? In the second 
hard case, an agency view is supported by a majority of the outside 
 
one vote in the parliament of experts. Because outside expert panels rarely split by such small 
margins, this is unlikely to make a difference in many real cases. 
  98. See,  e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 967–70 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam) (treating an internal staff paper as relevant to judging the adequacy of the agency’s 
decisionmaking), vacated in part, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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expert panel, but counting the votes of internal expert staff separately 
would tip the overall count of expert votes against the agency. 
The approach I suggest implies that the views of expert staff 
should be counted in both of these hard cases. Career experts within 
the agency are at least partly insulated from political interference by 
civil service protections, thick but informal norms of professional 
autonomy, and mission orientation.
100 As a result, they not 
infrequently make findings that politically appointed agency heads 
override or ignore, as occurred in the particulate matter controversy. 
Whether they support or oppose the findings of the agency head, the 
expert views of internal staff provide epistemically valuable 
information that reviewing courts can and should take into account, 
without large increases in the costs of judicial decisionmaking. 
A cost of this approach is that it might give agencies tactical 
incentives to hire more internal experts, in the hope of swamping 
expert advisory panels by sheer weight of numbers. This is a self-
limiting problem, however, and thus not a major concern. Hiring 
internal staff experts is costly business, given the civil service 
protections and general red tape surrounding federal employment, 
and the agency will anticipate that it will be saddled with the internal 
experts even after the particular rulemaking or adjudication at issue is 
long since past. 
E.  Facts, Policymaking, and Statutory Authority 
The approach I suggest is consistent with the undisputed truth 
that the administrator, not CASAC, is charged by statute with finding 
facts and with ultimate legal responsibility for the decision.
101 The 
problem is to reconcile that authority with the statutory command 
that the agency must give adequate reasons for rejecting CASAC’s 
findings and recommendations. In the framework I have set out, these 
provisions are best understood as entrusting the agency with legal 
responsibility for making the ultimate decision, based in turn on the 
best available judgments of fact. They entrust the agency with the 
evaluation of alternative policies, and with deciding what the agency 
will do given some determination of the state of the world, but they 
provide no reason to privilege the agency’s unilateral determination 
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of facts, when the agency’s reasons for rejecting expert conclusions 
are inadequate. The agency is entitled to decide what to do, and can 
always reject a panel’s recommendation on the grounds that the 
agency evaluates possible policies differently than does the panel, or 
that the agency wishes to allocate resources differently. The agency, 
however, is not entitled to make determinations of fact, causation, or 
prediction that depart from the best epistemic indicator of the truth 
of those matters—the expert panel’s view—absent some second-order 
reason to think that the epistemic quality of that view was 
compromised. 
In Universal Camera, likewise, the Court noted that the agency 
had been charged with fact-finding and decisionmaking authority, but 
nonetheless held that on an appropriate record the expert factfinder’s 
conclusions could trump that of the agency. Accordingly it reversed 
the lower court, which had said that the grant of fact-finding and 
decisionmaking authority to the agency meant that the agency’s 
findings must prevail over those of a hearing examiner. A main point 
of Universal Camera is that a statutory grant of fact-finding authority 
to the agency does not immunize the agency’s factual conclusions 
when expert factfinders disagree. 
That said, the approach I suggest is squarely inconsistent with the 
broad principle that, “in the event of a scientific disagreement 
between experts, the [agency] is free to rely on the expert opinion of 
[its] choice.”
102 This principle is too broad; taken literally, it would 
allow the agency to rely on the view of even a single dissenting expert, 
as against the otherwise unanimous view of the whole scientific 
community. The principle does apply sensibly in cases like Oregon 
Natural Resources Council v. Daley, in which an expert body splits 
down the middle. When that is so, there is no alternative to letting the 
agency break the tie. When, however, an expert panel divides into a 
majority or supermajority and a minority of dissenters, the logic of 
tiebreaking no longer applies. 
F.  An Interpretive Default Rule 
Congress could of course specify, in the organic statute or 
elsewhere, that the agency’s first-order view of the facts will prevail in 
the event of a disagreement with a panel consensus or a panel 
majority; if so, then those first-order views would count as legally 
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sufficient reasons. Congress has not legislated so specifically, 
however. In the case of the CAA, Congress simply said that the EPA 
Administrator must supply “an explanation of the reasons for such 
differences [between CASAC findings or recommendations and 
EPA’s final rules]”;
103 so too with the secretary of HHS, who is 
obliged by statute to give a reason for rejecting a recommendation of 
the Advisory Committee on Childhood Vaccines (ACCV). It is an 
open question what sort of reasons such provisions should be 
understood to require. 
Absent more specific direction from Congress, should these 
provisions and others like them be interpreted to require first-order 
reasons—substantive views about the matters of fact, causation, and 
prediction on which CASAC offers its opinions? Or should they be 
interpreted to require second-order reasons about the relative 
epistemic quality of the agency’s views and CASAC’s? As an 
interpretive default rule, I suggest that, unless Congress clearly does 
specify otherwise, such provisions should be read to require the 
agency to give a valid second-order reason for departing from the 
factual findings of a scientific or technical advisory panel. The best 
epistemic practice is thus to treat the agency’s first-order reasons as 
just another vote that is outweighed by a contrary body of expert 
votes on factual matters. The only type of reason that suffices is a 
reason to think that, epistemically, the agency is better positioned 
than a (super)majority of the panel to get the facts right. Although 
such a showing is possible—I canvass some valid second-order 
reasons that agencies might be able to offer and substantiate in 
particular cases—it will usually be difficult. 
Nothing in this argument, however, suggests that agencies must 
defer to the panel’s evaluation of possible policies, given certain facts. 
As we have seen, courts allow agencies to set regulatory priorities and 
allocate resources, even in the face of panel recommendations to the 
contrary.
104 The logic of that restriction is that agencies may evaluate 
possible policies in light of their own preferences, rather than the 
panel’s, insofar as the law permits. A statutory duty to give reasons 
for rejecting a panel’s findings and recommendations,
105 then, is best 
 
  103.  42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2006). 
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understood as two very different duties with different consequences. 
As to findings, agencies must adopt the factual bases of a panel’s 
conclusions absent some valid second-order reason for rejecting 
them. By contrast, the agency need not adopt the panel’s overall 
recommendations for policies if agencies have a standard first-order 
reason for evaluating competing policies differently or for setting 
different regulatory priorities. Yet even in such cases, the agency will 
be forced to openly state its evaluative differences with the panel or 
its different regulatory priorities, thereby reducing the costs of 
monitoring to reviewing courts and democratic bodies. 
Under ordinary canons of statutory interpretation, I suggest, an 
approach of this sort makes the best sense overall of the ambiguous 
relationship between the agency that Congress established and the 
expert panel that Congress also established. A puzzle arises when the 
statute itself, as well as background principles of administrative law, 
make the agency responsible for the decision, yet the statute also 
gives the panel ability to make recommendations as well as factual 
findings.
106 In the case of the CAA, for example, there is some tension 
between Congress’s decisions both to make the agency responsible 
for the ultimate decision and also to specify that EPA must explain its 
reasons for differing from the panel’s findings and recommendations. 
The most sensible reconciliation, in light of general background 
principles of administrative law, is that Congress saw the scientific 
panel as occupying the best epistemic position to make judgments 
about questions of fact, leaving to EPA the important responsibility 
of evaluating alternative policies in light of those factual judgments. 
The same holds for the ACCV and the secretary of HHS.
107 
This is a point about the best interpretation of the agency’s 
organic statute, but it also helps to make sense of relevant APA 
 
  106.  Thanks to Jonathan Wiener for emphasizing the latter point. 
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(commenting that, although the FDA’s “cavalier and unexplained rejection of the opinion of its 
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standards and their interaction with the organic statutes. The APA’s 
background obligation of reasoned fact-finding and decisionmaking is 
best understood to require that the agency either defer to the expert 
panel as to factual matters or else give a reason to think that it, rather 
than the expert panel, is in the best epistemic position to determine 
relevant facts. This was the implicit logic of Universal Camera, in 
which the Court said that reviewing judges could look behind agency 
findings to consider whether the agency had given adequate reason 
for refusing to credit the contrary findings of a specialized hearing 
examiner.
108 The Court’s discussion, as amplified and clarified by 
Learned Hand and Jerome Frank in opinions on remand, suggests 
that examiners are usually best situated to determine witness 
credibility and demeanor, and that to reject their findings, the agency 
must give a reason that “results from the [agency’s] rational use of the 
[agency’s] specialized knowledge.”
109 The agency, in other words, 
must show that its epistemic competence is greater, on average, than 
the expert factfinder’s epistemic competence, as to the relevant class 
of questions. 
G.  Fact-Finding and Second-Order Reasons 
On this approach, the key issue, and the key holding of Universal 
Camera, involves comparative epistemic competence: whether the 
agency or expert is best positioned to determine relevant facts, where 
reviewing courts who lack direct knowledge themselves should place 
their epistemic bets, and, more generally, how fact-finding authority 
should be allocated between agencies and their expert advisors. 
Agencies are not always obliged to find facts in accordance with the 
expert panel’s view. Rather, agencies should be allowed to reject 
panel findings if they substantiate the right sort of second-order 
reason. 
In general, valid second-order reasons will give reviewing courts 
confidence that the best epistemic bet is to rely on the agency’s first-
order views rather than those of the expert panel. Agencies should be 
able to reject panel findings only if they can give concrete reason to 
think that the epistemic quality of the expert panel’s conclusions are 
low, relative to the agency’s own views. It follows that valid reasons 
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will just be the flipside of the permissible epistemic strategies 
discussed in Parts II and III. 
H. Track  Records 
In some cases, agencies will have information about the accuracy 
of an expert panel’s past factual estimates, the causal theories it 
advanced, or its past predictions. When this is so, agencies might be 
able to show that the panel has often erred. This is likely to be a rare 
case, however, and courts should be wary of this sort of second-order 
claim for several reasons. 
Mere inaccuracy does not show that a past panel’s conclusions 
were epistemically flawed or that the agency’s own first-order views 
are likely to be systematically superior. Because factual 
determinations, causal theories, and predictions of any complexity 
will inevitably have a “stochastic” element—an element of irreducible 
randomness, arising from the costs of information or built into the 
nature of things—it is perfectly possible that the panel’s conclusions 
are systematically superior to the agency’s, from an ex ante 
perspective, even if the panel’s conclusions have sometimes turned 
out to be wrong. Furthermore, panels whose members serve for long 
periods may develop “endogenous expertise”
110 through experience 
and institutional learning over time. In such cases, the panel’s initial 
findings and predictions may be flawed, but their quality will 
systematically improve over time. From the standpoint of the 
reviewing court, the best epistemic bet overall may still be to trust the 
conclusions of the expert panel over the agency’s views. 
These points imply that a high rate of turnover among panel 
members may make it difficult to gauge the track record of the panel. 
Indeed, as turnover increases, “the panel” becomes an increasingly 
ill-defined entity. Reviewing courts could plausibly, and without much 
difficulty, discount the validity of an agency’s appeal to the panel’s 
track record by the rate at which panel membership has changed over 
time. Such a practice would reduce, at the margin, agency incentives 
to manipulate the composition of expert panels by substituting new 
members whose viewpoints will predictably track the agency’s own.
111 
 
  110. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency 
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By doing so, the agency would also be undercutting its own ability to 
appeal to the panel’s track record as a basis for departing from its 
views. 
I. Comparative  Qualifications 
In some cases, agencies will have valid reason to reject nose 
counting—to decline to follow a (super)majority view of the panel—
because the agency validly weights votes by the qualifications of the 
voters. In the black lung cases it is perfectly rational for the agency 
adjudicator to believe the diagnoses of two doctors with special 
qualifications in detecting pneumoconiosis over the diagnoses of 
three general practitioners. Counting weighted votes is an epistemic 
improvement, so long as the weights track competence and—a crucial 
qualification—so long as the discounted voters bring no cognitive 
diversity to the group. If the latter condition does not hold because 
the discounted voters bring new perspectives or have views that, by 
training or profession, are likely to be uncorrelated with the views of 
highly competent experts, then the logic of the Jury Theorem suggests 
that the group’s overall epistemic performance will be better than the 
views of even its most expert members.
112 
J. Bias 
In other cases, agencies might be able to point to systematic bias 
among members of the panel in order to impeach the epistemic 
warrant for their conclusions. If statutes create a panel composed, for 
example, largely of experts drawn from a certain discipline, 
profession, or industry, and if the panel’s recommendations track 
apparent disciplinary or professional biases or industry interests, 
there is valid ground for concern. In National Nutritional Foods Ass’n 
v. Califano,
113 the Second Circuit heard a challenge to the composition 
of an advisory committee charged with making recommendations 
about whether consumer warnings should be placed on packaged 
dietary supplements. Although the challenge was dismissed on 
procedural grounds not relevant here, the court noted that the panel 
was composed solely of physicians, that the physicians were 
 
scientists on the list were, indeed, “retired” by the Reagan EPA. Nicholas A. Ashford, Advisory 
Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use in Regulatory Decisionmaking, 9 SCI. TECH. & HUM. 
VALUES 72, 72 n.1, 77 n.16 (1984). 
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“understandably leaning in favor of medical supervision of [the 
underlying substances],”
114 and that the panel’s skewed composition 
“directly implicates the concern Congress addressed in [the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act], that agency action might be dominated by 
one particular viewpoint.”
115 By analogy, the same concerns suggest 
that agencies will have better second-order reason to depart from 
panel recommendations when the panel’s composition is narrowly 
defined or drawn predominantly from industry. 
Here there are two relevant interpretations of the vague term 
“bias”: motivational and epistemic. In the former sense, bias means 
that the expert is not even trying to reach the right answer, as 
opposed to the answer that benefits the expert’s firm or career; in the 
latter sense, bias means that the expert has blind spots arising 
precisely from specialized training or knowledge. In Jury Theorem 
terms, bias may thus be understood either as a simple violation of the 
condition of sincere voting, at the level of individuals, or else as a 
concern about the positive correlation of errors across the group. If 
members of a scientific subdiscipline, profession, or industry have 
highly correlated perspectives, it is less likely that errors will wash out 
at the group level. 
In many cases, however, the underlying statutes require a mix of 
professions, disciplines, and perspectives, specifying with particularity 
how the panel should be composed. Under the CAA, for example, 
CASAC comprises “at least one member of the National Academy of 
Sciences, one physician, and one person representing State air 
pollution control agencies.”
116 Likewise, the ACCV is comprised of 
health experts, members of the general public (two of whom have 
children who have suffered vaccine-related injury or death), lawyers, 
and officials from relevant agencies. Even more pointedly, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Revitalization Act of 1993
117 
authorizes the secretary of HHS to appoint an Ethics Advisory 
Board.
118 If such a board is appointed, it must have between fourteen 
and twenty members, including at least one attorney, one ethicist, one 
practicing physician, one theologian, and no fewer than one-third but 
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no more than one-half of the members may be “scientists with 
substantial accomplishments in biomedical or behavioral research.”
119 
Most generally, the Federal Advisory Committee Act indirectly 
requires  that  “the  membership  of . . . advisory  committee[s] . . . be 
fairly balanced.”
120 
Requirements of this sort trade off some scientific competence, 
at the margin, for greater representation of affected interests and 
reduced correlation of errors at the group level. Individual epistemic 
competence of the panel members is just one good, which should be 
optimized, not maximized; balanced panels of this sort can create 
overall gains by sacrificing some expertise for a reduced chance that 
the biases of any one affected interest will dominate. In the case of 
the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, the lower bound on biomedical 
scientists (at least one-third of the panel) promotes expertise, and the 
upper bound (no more than one-half of the panel) promotes 
epistemic diversity by restricting the representation of a particular 
scientific subfield. Similarly, a diversity of affected interests minimizes 
the chance that panel members will deliberately falsify an appearance 
of consensus in order to maximize their influence. Because diverse 
interests will predictably have crosscutting agendas, the chances that 
the panel can agree on a single position are reduced; more likely is 
open disagreement, providing more information to agencies and 
reviewing courts. 
The cost of epistemic diversity is a slightly increased chance that 
some members of a panel will believe something truly bizarre—that 
lead is beneficial or that last week’s cold weather shows that climate 
change is not occurring.
121 Under the approach I am suggesting, the 
agency would be barred from simply rejecting these conclusions on 
the first-order ground that the agency knows them to be false. Yet in 
order for these bizarre views to make any difference, they must (1) 
obtain the agreement of a majority of panel members, expert as well 
as nonexpert, (2) under circumstances in which the agency has no 
valid second-order reason to reject the panel’s conclusions. The 
wackier the error, the less likely it is that those additional two 
conditions will hold, so this is another self-limiting problem. 
The consequences for administrative law and judicial review are 
straightforward. When requirements of epistemic diversity are in 
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place, courts should be reluctant to accept an agency’s appeal to 
systematic disciplinary, professional, or industry-based bias. When an 
expert panel is drawn solely from a narrow professional subcategory 
or subdiscipline, or staffed largely by representatives from a 
particular industry or segment of industry, an agency appeal to bias 
should be taken more seriously. 
To illustrate the right analysis, CASAC is a possible target for an 
agency challenge of this sort; but the challenge is weak and should 
fail. The overall Science Advisory Board is required by the board’s 
charter to be comprised of “independent experts in the fields of 
science, engineering, economics, and other social sciences to provide 
a range of expertise required to assess the scientific and technical 
aspects of environmental issues.”
122 Here, all panel members are 
scientists and technicians, but not from any particular discipline or 
scientific field, in accordance with the statute’s mandate for 
“diversity” and “a range of expertise.” CASAC, a committee of the 
Science Advisory Board with an independent statutory charter, is 
diverse across professions as well as within scientific disciplines; it 
contains, at a minimum, a physician and a state environmental 
official, in addition to scientists and engineers of various types. 
K.  Groupthink and Judgment Falsification 
In general, agencies should be allowed to depart from the views 
of experts when there is good reason to think that herding or 
groupthink has occurred. In these cases, the agency has a valid 
second-order reason for discounting an expert majority view, or 
consensus; if the problem is serious, the agency’s first-order view may 
be the only independently formed first-order view in the field. Here 
there is a good deal of overlap with the vague idea of “bias,” 
interpreted in its epistemic rather than motivational sense. Even if the 
goal of all panel members is to get the answer right, copying of others’ 
views, although individually rational, can make the group decision 
uninformed. 
Although various forms of groupthink are a real concern, there 
are two relevant cautions. First, the mere fact that some experts on a 
panel follow the views of other experts does not amount to 
groupthink, or necessarily reduce the overall epistemic competence of 
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the group. If panel members defer to a highly competent opinion 
leader, group epistemic competence can increase overall. 
Equivalently, herding or information cascades cannot be inferred 
from the bare fact that some members of the panel copy the views of 
others. If the copying members have metaexpertise—if they are quite 
adept at figuring out who among them are the best experts—then 
copying can actually improve the group’s overall performance.
123 The 
copiers “may be poor meteorologists, but good judges of 
meteorologists.”
124 
Second, the risk of groupthink is sensitive to the composition and 
structure of the panel and the decisionmaking processes it uses. 
Accordingly, agencies will have valid second-order reasons to 
discount the consensus of expert panels when they can point to 
features of the panel’s composition, structure, or decisionmaking 
process that raise red flags. When an expert panel is all drawn from 
the same subfield; when experts vote or express judgments in 
sequence and with knowledge of each others’ views; when experts are 
uncompensated or when their compensation is a function of 
individual rather than group performance; and when a panel’s views 
are completely unanimous on an issue the agency has independent 
reason to think is at least difficult, then the risk of harmful groupthink 
is at an apogee and reviewing courts should take the agency’s second-
order concerns most seriously. 
L.  The Unanimity Dilemma 
Special problems arise when an expert panel is unanimous or 
reports consensus without a formal vote. In these cases, both agencies 
and reviewing courts are in something of an epistemic dilemma. 
Unanimity can arise either because all experts on the panel, whatever 
their biases, are receiving a strong and uniform signal from reality 
about an issue of fact or causation. It can also be a sign of herding, 
cascades, or judgment falsification. Unanimity is epistemically 
ambiguous. By contrast, the most powerful expert consensus is a 
supermajority that is not unanimous. The open dissent shows that the 
supermajority’s view has been epistemically tested by vigorous 
disagreement, yet has still prevailed. 
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Unanimity, then, is both potentially powerful and potentially 
suspect. Under what conditions is it most likely to be one or the 
other? When reviewing courts have a prior belief that the issue is an 
easy one, or that the facts lean strongly in one direction, unanimity is 
best taken as a warning that an agency’s contrary view would lack any 
basis in fact. In most regulatory issues that reach the stage of final 
agency action, however, and for which an expert panel has been 
appointed, it is unlikely in the extreme that the issue is antecedently 
known to be an easy one, or that the facts overwhelmingly favor one 
view. In these circumstances, unanimity is likely to be suspect, 
whereas disagreement within the panel should actually increase the 
agency’s, and the reviewing court’s, epistemic confidence in the 
conclusions of the panel majority or supermajority. 
One implication, somewhat counterintuitive, is that agencies 
should not generally be allowed to impeach the conclusions of a panel 
majority by claiming that disagreement within the panel shows that 
the minority view is reasonable. It may be so, but the question is 
where agencies and reviewing courts should place their epistemic 
bets: with the minority or with the majority. The logic of expert 
aggregation suggests that placing epistemic bets on panel majorities is 
the better course, on average. And if panels collectively desire to 
maximize the chance the agency will adopt their recommendations, a 
legal rule that allows agencies to impeach panel conclusions by 
pointing to reasonable dissent will give panels incentives to falsify an 
appearance of consensus, thus suppressing useful information. 
In the 2006 controversy over fine particulate matter, the 
administrator pointed out that the CASAC subcommittee was not 
unanimous, as a basis for differing from its recommendations. This 
argument is doubly misguided. The questions at issue were hardly 
simple, whatever their correct resolution. CASAC’s decision, 
endorsed by a large but nonunanimous supermajority, actually 
offered firmer grounds for epistemic confidence than a unanimous 
one, by showing that relevant arguments had been ventilated; using 
non-unanimity as a basis for rejecting the panel’s views gives CASAC 
members a heightened incentive to create a false appearance of 
consensus in the future. Happily, the reviewing court paid no heed to 
the administrator’s observation.
125 
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M.  An Undemanding Presumption 
Although we have canvassed a range of second-order reasons to 
which agencies might appeal, the judicial task under this framework is 
not terribly demanding. The structure of the inquiry is a simple 
presumption: unless agencies can clearly establish that a valid second-
order reason exists, the agency is obliged to adopt the expert panel’s 
factual findings. Although the second-order reasons set out above will 
be unfamiliar to some judges, the concepts are not difficult in 
themselves. As we have seen, FDA recently drew upon the academic 
literature on information cascades to formulate voting rules for its 
advisory panels,
126 so judges should have little difficulty with these 
tools. In comparative terms, the suggested inquiry is no more 
demanding, and quite possibly less demanding, than standard hard 
look review of the agency’s first-order reasons, which, effectively, 
requires judges to decide whether the agency’s substantive scientific 
and technical claims are minimally plausible. 
CONCLUSION 
I will conclude by returning to the puzzles laid out at the 
beginning of the introduction and indicating how they should be 
resolved under the framework I have suggested. In reverse order: 
￿ When an expert panel is evenly split, as in Oregon Natural 
Resources Council v. Daley, the agency should have a tiebreaking 
vote, and a first-order reason should be sufficient. The agency’s view 
counts for at least one, although for no more than one. On jury-
theoretic grounds, the views of half of the panel plus the agency’s 
first-order views are more likely to be correct than the views of the 
other half of the panel. More pragmatically, there is no obvious 
alternative to letting the agency break the tie. 
￿  In the black lung cases, and other cases in which a crisply 
defined issue of fact or causation is presented to an agency 
adjudicator, nose counting should generally be an acceptable basis for 
decision under the arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence 
tests. Nose counting is a rational second-order epistemic strategy; to 
require an administrative law judge to disgorge a first-order reason, 
such as a medical opinion, in order to arbitrate an expert 
disagreement guarantees arbitrary decisionmaking. 
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￿ Agencies should be obliged to follow the (super)majority view 
of an expert panel, as to matters of fact, causation, or prediction, 
unless they can give a valid second-order reason for rejecting that 
view—for example, that the panel’s composition made it inadequately 
diverse, or that its decisionmaking processes or structure made 
groupthink or judgment falsification a serious risk. A hard case arises 
where an expert panel is unanimous or reports consensus. Here, the 
decision represents either of two epistemic extremes: maximally 
persuasive or epistemically suspect. 
￿  EPA’s decisions, in 1979 and 1997, to follow the CASAC 
(super)majority were both correct. Neither was consistent with its 
2006 decision, in a rulemaking on the same questions, not to follow 
the CASAC supermajority; thus the D.C. Circuit correctly held that 
the 2006 decision was inadequately reasoned. When, as in the 2006 
rulemaking, a large supermajority of a nonunanimous panel reaches a 
certain conclusion, the agency will rarely have a valid second-order 
reason to depart from the panel’s view. Because of the presence of 
dissenters, the epistemic quality of the expert majority is at an 
apogee. The administrator’s observation in the 2006 rulemaking that 
the expert panel was not unanimous actually undermined his decision 
to depart from its conclusions; it gave more reason, not less reason, to 
consider his views erroneous. 
My largest point, running throughout the foregoing, is that 
administrative law inconsistently aggregates expert opinions. Some 
decisions are unduly and even irrationally reluctant to grant a formal 
role to nose counting of experts or expert panels. Voting by expert 
panels is likely, on average, to be an epistemically superior 
mechanism for determining facts and causation, and for making 
predictions, than is the first-order judgment of agency heads in 
rulemaking or adjudication. Many believe that agencies should be 
politically accountable to Congress; there are equally strong grounds 
to think that they should be epistemically accountable to the 
parliament of the experts. 